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Dangerous or Just Pregnant?
How Sanism & Biases Infect the Dangerousness Determination
in the Civil Commitment Context of Pregnant Women
Note by Alyson R. Schwartz*
There is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single-issue lives.1

Introduction
Alicia Beltran encountered the harsh realities of a legislature that treats
women as environments for pregnancy, rather than as persons with constitutional
rights. Fourteen weeks into her pregnancy, Alicia attended a routine prenatal
visit and disclosed a previous medical condition (painkiller addiction) and her
successful efforts to end that addiction.2 Alicia subsequently declined her doctor’s
recommendation to use Suboxone, an anti-addiction drug, because she was unable
to afford the prescription on her salary as a waitress.3 Alicia soon learned that a
Wisconsin statute4 empowers medical professionals to police their patients, rather
than offer recommendations of care. As a result, the doctor Alicia trusted with her
medical information became empowered by the State to utilize his personal beliefs
to determine that she lacks “self-control” with drugs.

* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. expected 2015; State University of New York
at Stony Brook University B.A., MBA 2011. I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor
Dawn Johnsen for her support and guidance throughout this process. I am also immensely
grateful to the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality associates and editorial team for
their careful review and editing of my work. Last, but never least, I am thankful to my Mother
for her unwavering inspiration and support.
1. Audre Lorde, Learning from the 60s, Address at Harvard University (Feb. 1982), in Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches 138 (1984).
2. Erik Eckholm, Case Explores Rights of Fetus Versus Mother, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/us/case-explores-rights-of-fetus-versus-mother.html.
3. Id.
4. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
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Despite never testing positive for substance use, Alicia was arrested and
forced to appear in shackles before a family court commissioner.5 Although she
was not afforded representation at her hearing, a lawyer had already been appointed
as guardian ad litem for her fetus.6 Seemingly ignoring Wisconsin precedent that
a civilly committed individual must be presumed competent,7 the commissioner
ordered the civil commitment of Alicia at an inpatient drug treatment program
without hearing a single word of medical expert testimony.8
The circumstances surrounding Alicia’s civil commitment pose great
concerns. Alicia was shackled and detained absent any medical testimony—not in
1853, as one would expect,9 but in 2013. Since the Wisconsin legislature authorized
forcible commitment of pregnant women with alleged substance use under the
guise of protectionist arguments in 1997, it is unclear how many women have been
harmed due to the confidential nature of the proceedings.10
Alicia’s case represented the first constitutional challenge to state statutes
that explicitly allow civil commitment for pregnant women with alleged substance
use.11 Unfortunately, Wisconsin is not the only state in which stories like Alicia’s can
5. Eckholm, supra note 2; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 by a Person in Custody at 9, Beltran v. Loenish, No. 2:13-cv-01101 (E.D. Wis. filed
Sept. 30, 2013).
6. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Advocacy Group Seeks Immediate Release of Involuntarily Detained Pregnant Woman, RH Reality Check (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.
org/article/2013/10/03/advocacy-group-seeks-immediate-release-of-pregnant-woman-detained-involuntarily-for-drug-treatment/.
7. Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976), reinstating 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (invalidating Wisconsin statute presuming civilly committed individuals incompetent).
8. Pieklo, supra note 6.
9. Historians have found that from 1850 to 1900 women were committed to mental institutions “for behaving in ways male society did not agree with,” including use of unacceptable
“abusive” language, irregular mensuration, abortion, nymphomania, and “domestic troubles.”
Katherine Pouba & Ashley Tianen, Lunacy in the 19th Century: Women’s Admission to Asylums in United States of America, 1 Oshkosh Scholar 95 (2006).
10. Pieklo, supra note 6. For an example of one of the more recent cases reported, see Jessica Mason Pieklo, Pregnant Wisconsin Woman Jailed Under State’s ‘Personhood’-Like Law,
RH Reality Check (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/12/12/
pregnant-wisconsin-woman-jailed-states-personhood-like-law/.
11. Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, First Federal Challenge to Arrest
of Pregnant Woman Under “Personhood”-Like Measure Filed in Wisconsin (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/Beltran-NAPW%20-%20Press%20Release%20
-%2010.2.13.pdf. Subsequently, on September 30, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge C.N. Clevert, Jr. dismissed as moot Alicia Beltran’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, following the State’s
withdrawal of its petition. Beltran v. Strachota, No. 2:13-cv-01101, 2014 WL 4924668 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). The Court declined to take a position regarding the possibility of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id. at *7; Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Wisconsin Alicia Beltran Case Federal District Court Avoids Ruling on Constitutionality (Sept. 30,
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occur. Four states—Minnesota,12 Oklahoma,13 South Dakota,14 and Wisconsin15—
currently authorize civil commitment for pregnant women suspected of substance
use. Additionally, at least thirty-four states have attempted to use existing criminal
statutes—such as crimes of child abuse, child neglect, and delivery of drugs to
a minor—to prosecute pregnant women.16 The outcome of these cases, including
Alicia’s, could have serious implications for the millions of women who become
pregnant every year in the United States.17
“Childbearing is a major life passage for over 4.3 million mothers, newborns,
and families annually in the United States. . . . Only three reasons for outpatient visits
involve more visits annually than maternity care (prenatal and postpartum visits
combined): general medical examination, progress visit, and cough.”18 As a result,
pregnancy and state intervention has naturally been a topic of debate amongst many
legal scholars.19 Our nation’s history is plagued with limits uniquely applicable to
2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/09/wisconsin_alicia_beltran_case.
php (“The Court suggested, however, that another civil rights action, potentially representing
a class of women brought within the ambit of the law, might not present the same mootness
issues.”).
12. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
13. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-546.5 (West 2000); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 5-410
(West 2014).
14. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-63 (2011).
15. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
16. Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented Response to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 217, 218
(2001). Most recently, Tennessee passed a law that would allow prosecutors to bring criminal charges against pregnant women who struggle with drug dependency. Emily Crockett,
Tennessee Governor Signs Bill Criminalizing Pregnant Women, RH Reality Check (Apr. 29,
2014, 5:17 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/29/tennessee-governor-signs-billcriminalizing-pregnant-women/.
17. See, e.g., Sally C. Curtin, Joyce C. Abma & Stephanie J. Ventura, Nat’l Ctr. for
Health Statistics, Pregnancy Rates for U.S. Women Continue to Drop 1 (2013), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db136.pdf.
18. Carol Sakala & Maureen P. Corry, Evidence-Based Maternity Care: What It Is and
What It Can Achieve 2 (2008), http://www.milbank.org/uploads/documents/0809MaternityC
are/0809MaternityCare.pdf.
19. See, e.g., April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 147 (2007); Lynn M.
Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8
DePaul J. Health Care L. 461 (2005); Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 16. For arguments that
civil commitment of pregnant women for drug use violates equal protection and due process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, see Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by
Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381 (2008). For constitutional arguments examining the criminalization approach towards women who use drugs while pregnant, see Barrie L. Becker,
Order in the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-Dependent
Defendants to Protect Fetal Health, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 235 (1991); Molly McNulty,
Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women
for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277 (1987–88).
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women due to their reproductive capacity.20 Yet, in today’s environment where many
limits have been found to be constitutionally impermissible,21 at least one loophole
remains open: civil commitment for pregnant women with alleged substance use.
There has been great scholarly inquiry into whether civil commitment of
pregnant women on the basis of fetal protection violates constitutional rights.22 Some
legal scholars have argued that such confinement is a clear violation of due process,
equal protection, privacy rights, and reproductive rights.23 While in agreement with
those scholars, this Note will focus on how sanism and additional biases diminish the
legal standards of civil commitment when applied to pregnant women.
Civil commitment determinations are already infiltrated by sanism: an
irrational prejudice against those with mental disabilities and illnesses expressed
through stereotyping and stigmatization, similar to that of other prejudices such as
racism and sexism.24 Yet, deficiencies in civil commitment safeguards for pregnant
women cannot be explained simply as an issue of sanism, gender oppression, wealth
inequality, or racism. Rather, each of these components must be combined to reveal
how the interaction of each erodes the constitutional protections of civil commitment,
thereby preventing the law from being applied in a way that would avoid these
problems. States should refrain from manipulating their civil commitment laws to
extend to pregnant women with alleged substance use.
Part I of this Note will discuss civil commitment through an examination
of the history of state powers, current constitutional doctrine, and the difficulties in
quantifying dangerousness. Part II of this Note will explore how sanism, pregnancy,
race, and socioeconomic status interact to diminish civil commitment safeguards. This
Note will conclude by applying the issues discussed to Alicia’s case and urging states to
recognize that application of the civil commitment standard to pregnant women, absent
other safeguards, will inevitably engender wrongful deprivations of liberty.
I.

Civil Commitment
Involuntary civil commitment is the legal, medical, and psychosocial
process—operating at the confluence of the public safety, justice,

20. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130,
132 (1872).
21. Contra Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. E.g., Erin N. Linder, Note, Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The Problems Inherent
in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address Addiction, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 873 (2005) (arguing
that civil commitment laws to prevent fetal alcohol syndrome violate due process and equal
protection).
23. See sources cited supra note 19.
24. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find Out When
You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 235, 235
(2001–02).
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and social service systems—whereby an individual alleged to be
harmful to self or others as a result of some physical or mental
impairment or disability (drug dependency, mental illness, mental
retardation, alcoholism, or some combination), is forced to undergo
some type of involuntary treatment or care.25
A. The Roots of Civil Commitment and Constitutional Developments
Involuntary civil commitment traces back to English law in 1714, which
permitted justices of the peace to restrain and confine the poor who posed a danger
as “furiously Mad.”26 As early as 1891, Supreme Court jurisprudence recognized
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.”27 Yet, courts still grapple with the difficulty in balancing civil commitment
rationales with individual liberty rights.
Great debate arises from the tendency of civil commitment to run afoul of
constitutional rights: against unreasonable search and seizure, to due process, against
restraints on liberty, and to refuse medical treatment. When a civil commitment
is premised solely upon dual status of pregnancy and substance use, additional
implications arise regarding equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and
the right to reproductive decision making.28 Policy issues also arise regarding the
effectiveness of treatment under involuntary detention, profit gouging by for-profit
institutions,29 and deterrence of those seeking medical care.30 The U.S. Supreme
Court arguably addressed these concerns in Addington v. Texas, holding that “civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection.”31
25. Sandra Anderson Garcia, Drug Addiction and Mother/Child Welfare: Rights, Laws, and
Discretionary Decisionmaking, 13 J. Legal Med. 129, 176 (1992).
26. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 85, 156–57 (2011).
27. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added).
28. See sources cited supra note 19.
29. Garcia, supra note 25, at 176.
30. At least in the pregnancy context, many legal scholars and health professionals have
argued that involuntary commitment can serve as a deterrent for pregnant women to voluntarily seek substance abuse care. See, e.g., Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women,
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 473, Substance Abuse
Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologist (2011) [hereinafter
ACOG No. 473] (reaffirmed 2014); Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons,
and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 999, 1044 (1999).
31. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Two traditional state powers provide the basis for civil commitment:
(1) police power, and (2) parens patriae power.32 Police power justifies civil
commitment when it implicates a state’s right to protect itself against breaches
of peace caused by a dangerous person.33 Parens patriae power justifies civil
commitment when it implicates a state’s right to act on behalf of an individual with
a mental disease or defect that prevents care for his or her own welfare.34 Although
both powers potentially allow for restraint on an individual’s physical liberty,
the U.S. Constitution imposes severe limits. For example, police power cannot
be used broadly to protect a community from all possible dangers.35 Likewise,
parens patriae power cannot be used sweepingly to protect an individual from all
improvident acts.36
Up until at least the 1960s, state courts did not afford a guarantee of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings.37 As a result of demands from the medical community, pressure grew
to implement unambiguous grounds for involuntary civil commitment.38 This push
was reflected in a shift in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine during the 1970s when the
Court took steps to refine the basis for civil commitment. First, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Jackson v. Indiana that Due Process Clause protections should be
afforded to those in civil commitment proceedings, despite traditional deference to
states to exercise “broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill.”39
Three years later, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme Court
formulated the minimum constitutional requirement for civil commitment:
A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given
a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be
32. Carol Gosain, Case Note, Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem
of Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel. Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 799, 828 (1997).
33. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that the police power of
a State includes “such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment
as will protect the public health and the public safety”); Cherry, supra note 19, at 177; Hugh
Alan Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 Mich. L. Rev.
945, 955 (1959).
34. Cherry, supra note 19, at 177; John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 499, 504 (1981); Developments in the Law–
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1207–22 (1974).
35. Cherry, supra note 19, at 177.
36. Id.
37. E.g., Prochaska v. Brinegar, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1960).
38. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Fed. Sec. Agency, Pub. Health Serv. Pub. No.
51, A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (1951).
39. 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972).
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identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous
to no one and can live safely in freedom. . . . In short, a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members or friends.40
In declaring a right to liberty in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme
Court set the groundwork for substantive constitutional limits for civil commitment.41
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Addington v. Texas that “clear
and convincing evidence” was the appropriate minimum standard of proof for civil
commitment proceedings.42 Black’s Law Dictionary has historically defined the
clear and convincing evidence standard to require proof that “will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to
be established.”43 States are still free, however, to require a higher level of proof
for civil commitments.44 For instance, in recognizing the risk for erroneous loss of
liberty, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts exceeded Addington’s “clear
and convincing” standard in requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.45
Today, depending on the jurisdiction, there are two permissible categories
for civil commitment if shown by clear and convincing evidence: (1) mental illness
and danger to self or others; and (2) detention when one needs treatment and is
incapable of procuring care.46 As a result, states are prohibited from committing
a person on the sole basis of mental illness status absent a showing of danger or
inability to care for oneself.
States have authorized civil commitment for drug and alcohol abuse47
by: specific statutory reference to involuntary commitment for drug use with a
40. 422 U.S. 563, 575, 576 (1975) (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 573 n.8, 576.
42. 441 U.S. 418, 425–33 (1979).
43. Black’s Law Dictionary 227 (5th ed. 1979). See also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G.
Gutheil, Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law 50−51 (2d ed. 1991).
44. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
45. Commonwealth v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Mass. 1980); Superintendent of
Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 372 N.E.2d 242, 245–46 (Mass. 1978).
46. Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 153.
47. The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta in Robinson v. California, has arguably left the door
wide open for states to use involuntary commitment to mandate alcohol or drug treatment
for substance-dependent individuals. See David F. Chavkin, “For Their Own Good”: Civil
Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 224, 246
(1992) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 n.7 (1962) (holding criminalization
of alcohol or drug addiction status as unconstitutional, yet civil commitment and mandatory
treatment as a constitutionally permissible alternative route)); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Ali
John Amirshahi, Civil Commitment for Drug Dependency: The Judicial Response, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 39, 43 (1992).
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showing of danger to self or others; inclusion of drug or alcohol addiction under
general references to “mental illness” with a showing of dependence and risk of
danger to self or others; or temporary emergency commitment for detoxification.48
These categories present a mix of police and parens patriae powers. Regardless of
whether a state elects to use police or parens patriae powers, courts encounter great
difficulties in determining whether requisite dangerousness is present to justify
involuntary civil commitment.
B. Inherent Difficulties in Determining Dangerousness
Despite the risk of serious deprivation of liberty that can result from a
finding of dangerousness, no precise or uniform definition of dangerousness
exists.49 The burden of proof falls upon the state requesting civil commitment
to demonstrate danger to self or others by a minimum of clear and convincing
evidence.50 Dangerousness can typically be shown by harm or attempted harm,
inability to care for oneself, or failure to remedy immediate and dangerous medical
problems resulting from substance abuse.51
Although the evidentiary standard of “clear and convincing” is the
constitutional minimum required by the U.S. Supreme Court, legislators and lower
courts have yet to clearly define what precise level of dangerousness is required for
civil commitment.52 While this Note argues that dangerousness should be defined
with true legal and medical concepts, alternative approaches include viewing
dangerousness as a socially defined condition53 or in the classic statement of Justice
Stewart, “I know it when I see it.”54
The U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to explain dangerousness fell short in its
dicta in Humphrey v. Cady.55 There the Court defined dangerousness as the point at
which a person’s “potential for doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough
to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.”56 Following this dicta in Humphrey,
a three-judge federal district court panel in Lessard v. Schmidt interpreted “great
enough” to imply use of a balancing test, which required “an extreme likelihood
48. Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 181−83.
49. Alexander D. Brooks, Notes on Defining the “Dangerousness” of the Mentally Ill, in
Dangerous Behavior: A Problem in Law and Mental Health 37, 39 (Calvin J. Frederick ed.,
1978).
50. Chavkin, supra note 47, at 267.
51. Hafemeister & Amirshahi, supra note 47, at 52.
52. Brooks, supra note 49, at 48.
53. E.g., Donald H. J. Hermann, Preventive Detention, a Scientific View of Man, and State
Power, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 673, 685 (1973).
54. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining the
difficulty in defining obscenity).
55. 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
56. Id.
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that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others.”57
Several courts have since incorporated the Lessard approach to require an overt
act signifying a real and present danger of significant harm.58 Yet, all courts do
not follow the overt act standard.59 For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit adopted an alternative approach in which a mere finding of
substantial risk of harm, as opposed to recent overt acts and threat of imminent
danger, is sufficient for a civil commitment.60
With a lack of legislative guidance, courts have traditionally received
broad discretion to interpret civil commitment statutes sweepingly; the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia previously found that writing a
bad check61 or emotional injury62 satisfied the requirement of “dangerousness”
for civil commitment. In addition to implementing its own judgment, courts have
historically “rubber stamped” any health professional’s subjective determination
of dangerousness despite the lack of any generally accepted meaning of the term
among the legal, psychiatric, or medical community.63
It is troublesome to rely on predictions of future dangerousness because
predictions are often wrong.64 False positive rates (that is, an incorrect finding
of future dangerousness) are far more likely than false negative rates (that is, an
incorrect finding of no future dangerousness).65 In fact, the American Psychiatric
Association filed an amicus brief strongly urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reject
psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness prognoses; future dangerousness
determinations are wrong in at least two out of every three predictions.66
57. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
58. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (adopting the Lessard overt
act standard); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509, 514−15 (D. Neb. 1975); In re Fasi, 567 A.2d 178, 183 (N.H. 1989).
59. See, e.g., Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 434 (D. Utah 1979);
United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978); In re Snowden,
423 A.2d 188, 191−92 & nn.3−4 (D.C. 1980); see also Michael J. Leiber & Sean Anderson,
A Comparison of Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Civil Commitment Decisionmaking in Dane
County, Wisconsin, 20 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 1, 3 (1993).
60. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
61. Brooks, supra note 49, at 41 & 58 n.24 (citing Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195
(D.C. Cir. 1960)).
62. Id. at 41 & 58 n.27 (citing Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
63. See id. at 41.
64. “[P]sychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.”
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (emphasis added).
65. See Ernst A. Wenk, James O. Robison & Gerald W. Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?,
18 Crime & Delinq. 393, 394 (1972); Leslie T. Wilkins, The Case for Prediction, in 3 Crime
and Justice: The Criminal in Confinement 375 (Leon Radzinowicz & Marvin E. Wolfgang
eds., 3d ed. 1971).
66. Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 3, Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
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Incorporation of Sanism

“Sanism” has also been defined as the belief that all persons with perceived
or actual mental illnesses or disabilities possess characteristics or abilities specific
to that category of illness, as to distinguish that condition as inferior to other
mental states.67 Sanism is both unique to mental disability law and analogous to
other “isms,” such as racism and sexism, which are fueled by stereotypes, myths,
and generalizations.68 Since the American Psychiatric Association recognized
substance-related and addictive disorders as mental disorders,69 such conditions are
also subject to the same irrational prejudices that manifest as sanism. Sanism is
especially problematic because it is often socially acceptable in ways other “isms”
may not be, and is a prejudice held by those who ordinarily would reject similar
biases in other contexts.70
There is a long history of the prejudicial effects of sanism on involuntary
civil commitments.71 In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the practice of forced
sterilization for women deemed mentally retarded because such persons were
“menace[s]” who “sap the strength of the state,” and it was necessary to “prevent
our being swamped with incompetence.”72 Today, a lack of set criteria for medical
evaluations and clear legal definitions provides the opportunity for the roots of sanism
to infiltrate medical and legal discretionary decision making. As Michael Perlin notes:
The entire legal system makes assumptions about persons with
mental disabilities—who they are, how they got that way, what
makes them different, what there is about them that lets us treat
them differently, and whether their conditions are immutable. These
assumptions reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental
disability, persons with mental disability, and the possibility that we
ourselves may become mentally disabled.73
Assumptions and biases have an even greater tendency to infiltrate civil
commitment proceedings due to the nature of many of the procedural issues. Many
67. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 535, 536 (2003).
68. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 683, 683 (2003).
69. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Substance-Related & Addictive Disorders (2013). The term
“substance dependent” was first included in the third edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1987. Henry R. Kranzler & Ting-Kai Li, What is
Addiction?, 31 Alcohol Res. & Health 93, 93 (2008).
70. Perlin, supra note 68, at 686.
71. See generally id.; Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. Rev. 373 (1992).
72. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206, 207 (1927).
73. Perlin, supra note 68, at 688.

242

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 3, Issue 2

of these procedural issues, unlike those of criminal cases, are rarely litigated.74 As a
result, most hearings become a matter of first impression,75 thereby granting judges
greater discretion. In cases regarding the right to refuse medical care, some judges
have been found to simply “rubber stamp” hospital treatment recommendations
without further investigation.76
While sanism itself presents concerns, additional biases can lead to further
diminishment of the protections of traditional civil commitment procedures, thereby
rendering established safeguards inadequate. Additional statuses—such as pregnant
drug user, minority background, and/or low socioeconomic class—carry an even
greater likelihood of inaccurate determinations of dangerousness.77 When a woman
deviates from society’s expectations, she can be seen as dangerous, irrespective of
any threat of harm posed to herself or to others. And, as Alexander Brooks explains,
“[s]ince very few mentally ill persons are presented for commitment unless their
behavior is perceived as somewhat deviant, the extent to which deviance is equated
with dangerousness tends to render the dangerousness standard meaningless.”78
A. Crossroads: Where Pregnancy, Substance Use, Socioeconomic Status,
and Race Intersect
Constitutional limits require that civil commitments be justified by at
least clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and a danger to oneself or
others.79 There are currently four states with statutes that explicitly authorize civil
commitment of pregnant women when drug or alcohol use poses a risk to the fetus.80
In response to a state supreme court decision,81 Wisconsin amended its state child
abuse law to include “unborn child” in order to subject a pregnant woman to civil
commitment when a habitual lack of self-control with drugs or alcohol poses a risk
to her unborn child’s health.82 Similar to Wisconsin’s approach, Oklahoma created a
separate section in its public health code, entitled the “Oklahoma Prenatal Addiction
Act,” permitting a district attorney to seek an “appropriate disposition,” including
74. Id. at 704−05.
75. Id. at 704.
76. Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretexuality, and
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 3, 16
(1999).
77. While this Note does not ignore the role of immigration status, language barriers, age,
and LGBTQ status amongst other biases, discussion will be limited to biases surrounding
gender, pregnancy, socioeconomic status, and race.
78. Brooks, supra note 49, at 42–43.
79. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Paltrow, supra note 19, at 469.
80. See supra notes 12–15.
81. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (holding the Wisconsin state legislature did not intend for term “child” in child abuse law to include fetus).
82. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
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involuntary commitment, for “a pregnant woman who is abusing or is addicted to
drugs or alcohol to the extent that the unborn child is at risk of harm.”83 Minnesota
took an alternative approach and included pregnant women who use drugs under its
preexisting statutory definition of “chemically dependent person[s]” subject to civil
commitment.84 Similarly, South Dakota added the status of “pregnant and abusing
alcohol or drugs” to its general civil commitment statute.85
Whether detention of pregnant women is pursued through general civil
commitment statutes86 or amended child protection statutes,87 problems arise. April
Cherry, a lawyer and legal scholar, stated:
Any determination that a woman had violated the [civil commitment]
statute would necessarily be speculative since scientific research in
this area is inconclusive; not all pregnant mothers who drink alcohol
or consume illicit drugs will bear children with injuries. Nor are
those who are injured by their mother’s prenatal alcohol or drug
use injured in the same manner or to the same extent. As a result,
any commitment made pursuant to the statute is based not on the
ordinary standard of clear and convincing evidence of harm, but
rather on inconclusive scientific research and often-speculative
beliefs regarding harm to the fetus.88
When inconclusive scientific evidence is paired with “a potentially perilous degree
of discretion”89 a prime opportunity is created for personal biases to infiltrate any
determination of dangerousness.
i. Pregnancy and Substance Use

From the perspective of radical feminists, societal views of motherhood,
including pregnancy, are shaped by patriarchal norms.90 In other words, the social
83. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-546.5 (West 2000).
84. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
85. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-63 (2011).
86. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
87. For specific reference to pregnant women in child welfare statutes see, for example,
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 48.01–02, 48.133–135, 48.193, 48.203–207, 48.213, 48.235, 48.305,
48.345, 48.347 (West 2014); cf. State v. Ayala, 991 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting civil commitment statute to allow for commitment of pregnant women for protection
of their fetuses).
88. Cherry, supra note 19, at 165 (emphasis added).
89. Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin’s Revised
Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. Med. & Ethics 332, 337 (1999).
90. April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 Tex. J. Women & L. 83, 91 (2001).
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institution of motherhood is “usually understood as the work that women are
culturally required to perform as childrearers.”91 Therefore, it is not surprising that
pregnant women encounter biases on the sole basis of being pregnant. Although
pregnancy can be a visible reminder to society of femininity and sexuality, pregnant
women are often perceived as “childlike.”92 Research showing societal discomfort
and disdain for pregnant women who are featured provocatively in the media
arguably demonstrates that nontraditional actions of pregnant women, such as
display of sexual appeal, is too “dangerous.”93
Research in the field of psychology yields additional implications. Young
adults have been found to “perceive pregnant women as irritable, emotional, and
suffering from physical maladies.”94 Other studies have shown that people hold
negative perceptions of and attitudes towards women who are pregnant in the
workplace.95 Yet additional psychological research finds that individuals are more
likely to provide assistance to a pregnant woman going about her daily activities
than to a nonpregnant woman in a similar situation.96 Therefore, the view of
pregnant women as both needing and deserving help due to their pregnant status
can simultaneously result in resentment and criticism for perceived dependence.97
These biases regarding pregnant women are intensified by the presence
of other factors, including substance use. A retired Wisconsin state representative
who helped write the state’s child welfare statute argued that civil commitment
of pregnant women was necessary because “[i]f the mother isn’t smart enough
not to do drugs, we’ve got to step in.”98 Perceptions of drug users as lacking selfcontrol and responsibility are intensified during pregnancy, since the woman is not
just seen as acting upon herself, but also upon her future child. As April Cherry
notes, a pregnant woman who uses drugs falls outside of society’s belief that good
mothers should be self-sacrificing, and is instead viewed as “self-indulgent, placing
her desire to get ‘high’ ahead of the need of her offspring to be born healthy.”99 This
preconceived notion of the personal qualities of pregnant drug users is reflected in
statutory language allowing for commitment when an expectant mother “habitually
lacks self-control.”100
91. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
92. Marci Lobel, Pregnancy and Mental Health, in 3 Encyclopedia of Mental Health 229,
232 (Howard Friedman ed., 1998).
93. Id.
94. Claire A. Etaugh & Judith S. Bridges, Women’s Lives: A Topical Approach 206
(2006) (citing research by Hilary Lips).
95. Id.
96. Lobel, supra note 92, at 232.
97. Id.
98. Eckholm, supra note 2 (emphasis added) (quoting Bonnie Ladwig).
99. Cherry, supra note 19, at 153 (quoting Jean Reith Schroedel, Is the Fetus a Real Person? A Comparison of Policies Across the Fifty States 103 (2002)).
100. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2011).

245

Spring 2015				

Dangerous or Just Pregnant?

Societal perceptions of pregnant women—with the additional layers of
race, socioeconomic status, and addiction—affect how providers and decision
makers respond to women more than knowledge of women’s rights and the
laws that may be used to control perinatal behavior.101 Decision makers may
have already formed an internal value determination as to whether addiction is
a result of physiological causes or free will. Should a decision maker hold a
preconceived belief that addiction is based solely on free will, and thus based on
moral culpability, he or she may be more likely to find a drug addict dangerous,
rather than forming an individualized determination.
Given the medical uncertainty of predicting outcomes in individual cases
of fetal exposure to drugs and alcohol, any medical evidence presented to meet
the “clear and convincing” standard is likely insufficient.102 Therefore, courtordered civil commitments have a greater likelihood of being based on myths of
drug use and whether the pregnant woman is conforming to societal standards,
rather than an individualized determination of actual dangerousness.
ii. Pregnancy, Low Socioeconomic Status, and Substance Use

Public perceptions of pregnant women also fluctuate depending on
the pregnant woman’s socioeconomic status. Studies comparing the strategic
placement of clothing in department stores revealed that higher-status stores were
more likely to place maternity clothing near lingerie sections than lower-status
stores.103 In contrast, lower-status stores were more likely to place maternity
clothing near uniforms or plus-size clothing.104 Since profit-driven department
stores arrange their products according to consumer preferences, it can be
inferred that product placement studies reflect societal views of pregnant women
that differ based on the woman’s socioeconomic class.105
The lower a woman’s socioeconomic class, the more likely she will be
viewed negatively when she becomes pregnant and is suspected of drug use.
Federal statutes already target low-income persons with a history of alcohol
and drug use, thereby reinforcing the stigma of addiction. For instance, the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF)106 creates a default
rule prohibiting receipt of benefits through TANF and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) if the applicant has a prior felony drug conviction.107
Conditioning receipt of needed benefits on previous substance use reflects the
101. Garcia, supra note 25, at 133.
102. De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 336.
103. Lobel, supra note 92, at 232.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601−619 (2012) (creating block grants for states to provide assistance
for families in need).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012).
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societal view that addiction is a matter of free will and representative of a poor
work ethic.108
Once pregnancy status is taken into consideration, the view of the “welfare
crack mother” is exaserbated.109 Review of the political climate during the 1980s
shows the popular characterization of all mothers receiving government benefits as
“unfit mothers selling their children’s food stamps to buy their next crack rock.”110
This generalized public image is reflective of conservative legislators’ underlying
motivations to reduce government spending for all pregnant women of low
socioeconomic status, regardless of whether or not drug use is present.111
The desire to eliminate government spending for pregnant women of low
socioeconomic status could easily translate into the perception that government
intervention is necessary to avoid future costs. In light of prior extensive press
coverage predicting the enormous costs of care for drug-addicted newborns and the
burdens that would fall on society from their disabilities,112 a decision maker may
be motivated to avoid such future societal costs rather than prevent an immediate,
actual danger.113 This trigger-happy approach may become more likely when the
decision maker believes the pregnant woman’s low socioeconomic status will
108. As of February 19, 2015, “[a]t least twelve states have passed legislation regarding
drug testing or screening for public assistance applicants or recipients.” Drug Testing for
Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx.
Conservative lawmakers have also proposed that states drug test unemployment applicants.
Alex M. Parker, GOP: Drug Tests for Unemployment Applicants, U.S. News & World Rep.
(Dec. 9, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/12/09/gop-drug-testsfor-unemployment-applicants.
109. Sheigla Murphy & Marsha Rosenbaum, Pregnant Women on Drugs: Combating
Stereotypes and Stigma 140 (1999) (“The image of poor inner-city African Americans,
whose mothering instincts had been destroyed by crack, was highly publicized and widely
accepted.”).
110. Id. at 142.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Karen Dukess, Children Born to Drug Users Need New Kind of Teaching,
St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 11, 1989, at 1A; Karen Dukess & Karl Vick, Cocaine’s Most Innocent Victims, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1; The Crack Children, Newsweek, Feb. 12, 1990, at 62; Study of Addicted Babies Hints Vast Cost, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17,
1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/17/us/study-of-addicted-babies-hints-vast-cost.html.
Based on 1990 figures, neonatal cost of health care for infants exposed to cocaine in utero
was estimated to reach an average of $5200 more than costs for an unexposed infant. During the 1990s, special education was predicted to be needed by all drug-exposed children at
an estimated cost of 2.6 times the amount of regular schooling. Page McGuire Linden, Drug
Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 Am. U. J. Gender
Soc. Pol’y & L. 105, 109 (1995).
113. Garcia, supra note 25, at 137 (“[O]nce individuals have come to terms with their
views on the social/community aspects of responsibility, they are also likely to take a position
on legal responsibility and accountability within both the criminal and civil law contexts.”).
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prevent her from paying for care once the child is born.
iii. Pregnancy, Race and Substance Use

The historical devaluation of black women as mothers results in biases
surrounding black women during their pregnancies.114 Dorothy Roberts examines
the social phenomena of devaluing black women as mothers, from reproductive
oppression of black women during slavery to coerced sterilization and the
unwarranted removal of black children from family households.115
The history of slavery and reproductive oppression of black women produced
long-lasting notions that black women are sexually promiscuous and outside of the
traditional ideology of femininity and motherhood.116 These longstanding prejudices
continue to establish white middle-class motherhood as the norm, supporting the
belief that black mothers are incapable of caring for their children.117 Not only do
black families tend to diverge from the traditional white nuclear family structure,
but black families are also more likely to be welfare recipients, which results in
government supervision through the welfare system and a greater likelihood of
neglect reports.118 Perceived neglect by black families who receive such government
assistance is more likely to be reported to government agencies than alleged neglect
by white, affluent families who are not subject to such government supervision.119
Resulting popular notions denigrate black mothers as incompetent and
lazy, only “breed[ing] children at the expense of taxpayers in order to increase the
amount of her welfare check.”120 When the patient is a woman of color or from a
lower socioeconomic class, medical professionals are more likely to perceive the
woman as incompetent and weigh the interests of the fetus as superior.121 In these
instances, doctors are more likely to seek court-ordered obstetrical intervention,
114. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1436−44 (1991).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1437−40.
117. Id. at 1441. The belief that black mothers are incapable traces back to the days of slavery, as evidenced by the census record in which a black child’s death from sudden infant death
syndrome was attributed to the entire “negro population” as “clearly . . . prov[ing] their great
carelessness & total inability to take care of themselves.” Michael P. Johnson, Smothered
Slave Infants: Were Slave Mothers at Fault?, 47 J.S. Hist. 493, 495 (1981); see also Todd L.
Savitt, Smothering and Overlaying of Virginia Slave Children: A Suggested Explanation, 49
Bull. Hist. Med. 400, 400 (1975).
118. Roberts, supra note 114, at 1440−41.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1444.
121. Cheryl E. Amana, Drugs, AIDS and Reproductive Choice: Maternal-State Conflict
Continues into the Millennium, 28 N.C. Cent. L.J. 32, 34 (2005).
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which courts overwhelmingly grant.122 Similarly, the perception that black
mothers are incompetent to make childrearing decisions overflows to all areas of
reproductive decisions. For instance, in 2011, a billboard of a young black girl in
a pretty pink dress was erected in a largely white community in New York City
with the message: “The most dangerous place for an African American is in the
womb.”123 Such public messages convey the idea that black women are not to be
trusted during pregnancy or motherhood, and provide an improper rationalization
for a decision maker’s belief that government intervention during pregnancy is
necessary before a black woman even steps foot in a civil commitment proceeding.
Individual biases and assumptions about race in the context of pregnancy
are exacerbated by targeted drug policies with a history of racial discrimination.
The first commission to assess drug use in the United States was established in
1908, arguably setting precedent for inflating statistics to promote racism under
the guise of drug policy.124 Heading the first commission, Dr. Wright associated
opium addiction with the Chinese and reported to Congress that “[c]ocaine is often
the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the Negroes.”125 It is not surprising,
then, that media coverage, beginning in the 1980s, reported the “War on Drugs”
in great depth with alarming language.126 The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was the
start of a crack cocaine sentencing disparity that continued for over two decades.127
“[P]ossession of crack—a drug predominantly found in communities of color—
was punished up to 100 times more harshly than powder cocaine, which is more
expensive and use of which is concentrated in white communities.”128
Interestingly, black communities located in inner cities have the highest
concentration of crack cocaine users.129 Traditional primary focus on “crack
babies” has resulted in disproportionate, highly publicized prosecutions of black
women alleged to use crack cocaine during pregnancy.130 Yet, studies now show
that the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the anticipated
medical consequences for children exposed to cocaine in utero that had motivated
122. Id. (“[W]hen court-ordered obstetrical intervention was sought, 81% of the women
involved were [women of color]. . . . Intervention was ordered in 86% of the cases . . . .”).
123. Liz Robbins, Billboard Opposing Abortion Stirs Debate, N.Y. Times (Feb. 23, 2011,
12:08 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/billboard-opposing-abortion-stirsdebate/. Although the billboard’s creators had anti-abortion motivations, such messages demonstrate a greater distrust of black women in health care decision making during all stages of
pregnancy.
124. See Mike Gray, Drug Crazy: How We Got into This Mess and How We Can Get
Out 41–43 (1998).
125. Id. at 46–47.
126. Paltrow, supra note 19, at 461 (quoting news reports describing crack as “a plague that
was eating away at the fabric of America” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
127. Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 385−86.
128. Id. at 385.
129. Roberts, supra note 114, at 1435.
130. Id.
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government intervention.131 Rather, researchers attribute poor fetal outcomes to
poverty and “challenging environments” common to those receiving governmentfunded medical assistance.132
Additional studies help to further explain the over-policing of minority
women who use drugs during pregnancy, and the under-policing of white women
who use drugs during pregnancy. Despite similar rates of overall substance abuse,
medical professionals are more likely to report drug use of minority women during
pregnancy than drug use of white women during pregnancy.133 A study showed
that amongst pregnant drug users, black women used cocaine more frequently,
while white women used marijuana more frequently.134 Yet, fetal rights supporters
continue to focus almost exclusively on crack cocaine despite the fact that rates of
alcohol and tobacco use amongst pregnant women are far greater, and while “the
effects of cocaine use may have been overstated in the past,” the harmful effects
of alcohol and tobacco use during pregnancy are better documented.135 Placing
emphasis on substances that are more likely to be used by minority women strongly
suggests that stereotypes and biases are at play.136
The likelihood of reporting is also greatly affected by what type of provider a
woman receives her prenatal care from. Black women are more likely to be reported
to government agencies for drug use.137 Poor women—who are disproportionately
black in the United States—are more likely to receive services from government
agencies, and, therefore, are subjected to greater government monitoring.138 Due to
discriminatory testing procedures and racial biases held by medical professionals,
government agencies providing prenatal services exert greater efforts to detect and
report substance use by black women.139 On the other hand, affluent women—
who are disproportionately white—are more likely to receive services from
private medical facilities that are less motivated to screen for drugs because of the
131. Decades Later, Drugs Didn’t Hold ‘Crack Babies’ Back, NPR (July 31, 2013, 12:00
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=207292639.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting
in Pinellas County, Florida, 332 New Eng. J. Med. 1202 (1990) (describing a study showing controlled substance abuse during pregnancy is ten times more likely to be reported to
authorities for black women, despite white women having slightly higher rates of drug usage
at first prenatal visit).
134. Id. at 1204.
135. Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance Abuse Among
Pregnant Women 6 (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/6/gr030603.pdf.
136. “Although the type of drug may differ, individuals from all races and socioeconomic
strata have similar rates of substance abuse and addiction.” ACOG No. 473, supra note 30, at 1.
137. Roberts, supra note 114, at 1422, 1432.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1422, 1432−34.
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financial incentive to retain business and receive referrals.140 In private medical
facility settings, medical professionals are more socially similar to their patients,
and, therefore, their biases surrounding pregnant drug users are less likely to be
implicated.141 Studies have demonstrated that doctors are inclined to communicate
with private white patients when there is a disagreement regarding treatment, but
are more likely to seek court assistance when there is treatment disagreement with
patients of color, of low socioeconomic class, with language barriers, or some
combination thereof.142
Medical professionals and government agency workers often hold strong
biases that result in higher rates of reporting from their interactions with black
and low-income pregnant women.143 As a result, the majority of women facing
criminal or civil proceedings are minorities and low-income.144 Such realities exist
even when taking into account that alcohol and drug use occurs across racial and
socioeconomic lines.145 These startling statistics perpetuate biases originating from
stereotypes and skewed media reports,146 biases already held by decision makers
in the civil commitment context. When the majority of women before a judge
or jury are minority, low-income women,147 the decision maker’s preconceived
biases are reaffirmed. Additionally, when the substance alleged is crack cocaine,
a decision maker may believe there is a greater presence of danger based on his or
her exposure to prior widespread coverage of predicted effects of crack cocaine on
fetal development.148
The reaffirmation of previously held biases founded and supported by
the news (for example, “black women have crack babies”) will then influence
140. Id. at 1433.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Amana, supra note 121, at 34 (citing Veronika E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher
& Michael T. Parsons, Court Ordered Obstetrical Intervention, 316 New Eng. J. Med. 1192,
1193−94 (1987)).
143. See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, The Policy and Politics of Reproductive Health: Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States,
1973−2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. Health Pol.
Pol’y & L. 299, 326−27 (2013).
144. Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 143, at 310 (summarizing study results showing that of those prosecuted, fifty-two percent were black and seventyone percent had low socioeconomic status (as represented by indigent defense)).
145. Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249.
146. See, e.g., Drew Humphries, Crack Mothers at 6: Prime-Time News, Crack/Cocaine,
and Women, 4 Violence Against Women 45 (1998) (performing a qualitative analysis of the
news’ presentation of black women and determining that black women are portrayed differently and more negatively than white women).
147. See Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249.
148. See Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty 154−59 (1997) (discussing the great extent of news coverage of maternal drug
abuse).
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the decision maker’s determination of dangerousness, rather than an individual
determination of the facts presented. In turn, minority and low-income women will
continue to be civilly committed and, as a result, continue to be the subjects of
news reports. Through this perilous cycle, overrepresentation of women of color
in criminal and civil proceedings continues to both create and reaffirm biases that
influence decision making.
B. The Multiplication Effect upon the Civil Commitment Standard
Biases infiltrating decision making multiply in the civil commitment
context when there are alleged threats to fetuses. Thus, traditional purposes and
safeguards of civil commitment are diminished when civil commitment is used to
police pregnant women. Prenatal and maternity care are already generalized, with
variations among categories of providers and geographic regions, rather than based
on the individual needs of each mother and her newborn.149 A Milbank Report finds
that evidence-based care is often disregarded in favor of disapproved and intrusive
health care practices for childbearing women.150
With a medical field that commonly utilizes a generalized care regimen
and holds particularized expectations of pregnant women, it is likely that medical
professionals and decision makers will exercise a strong bias towards a statistician’s
“type 2 error.”151 In other words, a medical professional or decision maker will
be more likely to classify a non-dangerous person as dangerous (false positive,
type 2) than to classify a dangerous person as non-dangerous (false negative, type
1).152 Decision makers are motivated to favor type 2 errors because there is greater
potential for harm and repercussions to the decision maker when misdiagnosing
dangerousness as opposed to misdiagnosing non-dangerousness.153 This tendency
is especially problematic when the decision maker already incorporates biases into
his or her exercise of broad discretion.
For example, South Dakota’s emergency commitment statute allows for a
woman who is pregnant and abusing drugs to be detained, yet fails to provide a
clear standard as to what constitutes “abusing alcohol or drugs.”154 Likewise, when
149. See, e.g., Sakala & Corry, supra note 18, at 1.
150. Id. at 4 (“Although most childbearing women and newborns in the United States are
healthy and at low risk for complications, national surveys reveal that essentially all women
who give birth in U.S. hospitals experience high rates of interventions with risks of adverse
effects.”).
151. D.L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 Santa Clara Law. 379, 385
(1973).
152. Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 49, at 44.
153. Brooks, supra note 49, at 44 (describing self-protectiveness as motivation for psychiatrists to refrain from providing “false negative” testimony).
154. Cherry, supra note 19, at 168−69; Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493−94 (citing S.D.
Codified Laws § 34-20A-63(3) (1998)).
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the Wisconsin legislature amended its child welfare statute to explicitly include
“expectant mothers,” it declined to include a single interpretive guideline.155 When
decision makers cannot turn to the text of the relevant law or state procedure
manuals for clarification, the opportunity exists for personal determinations of
dispositive issues such as what level of use qualifies as “abusing.”156 Such broad
discretion allows judges and juries, who are already prone to false positives, to
rely on improper biases and misperceptions, especially when great uncertainty
lies in determining harm from exposure to drugs or alcohol in utero.157
The difficulty in using only medical evidence to predict dangerousness
lies in the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude and probability of harm to a
fetus.158 Damage to fetuses dramatically varies from case to case, from instances
of no damage to instances of devastating damage.159 Yet, the public and media’s
assumption that “[a]ll drug-exposed children are seriously damaged at birth”
is reflected in legislative intent and statutory language.160 Contrary to public
perception, Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant
Women, explains:
It is certainly true that some newborns exposed prenatally to
some drugs do suffer adverse short- or long-term consequences—
as do infants whose mothers lacked access to quality prenatal
care and adequate nutrition, smoked or drank while pregnant, or
used fertility-enhancing medications that cause multiple births
associated with prematurity and other life-threatening hazards.
But as experts in the field have noted, “the public outcry for the
punishment of substance-using mothers and the disenfranchisement
of their children as [an] unsalvageable almost demonic ‘biologic
underclass’ rests not on scientific findings but upon media hysteria
fueled by selected anecdotes.”161

155. Cherry, supra note 19, at 166.
156. Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493−94.
157. See, e.g., De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 332 (“Even though substance abuse
poses a risk of harm to the child who will be born, its magnitude and probability is highly
uncertain.”).
158. Id.; see also Caroline S. Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal
Alcohol Abuse and the Viability of an Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Punitive
and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 Hastings Women’s L.J.
287, 298 (1999).
159. De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 332.
160. Paltrow, supra note 19, at 474−75.
161. Id. at 475 (emphasis added) (quoting Deborah A. Frank et al., Maternal Cocaine Use:
Impact on Child Health & Development, 40 Advances in Pediatrics 65 (1993)).
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Such media hysteria162 can serve as a primary source of knowledge about
particular scientific issues for many people, including medical professionals.163
As a result, despite numerous well-founded studies concluding that the predicted
“crack baby” epidemic was grossly exaggerated and that other factors are likely the
contributing causes of prenatal harm,164 decision makers may still continue to base
determinations of dangerousness on prior unsubstantiated media reports. Holding
on to one’s primary source of knowledge can result from a lack of awareness of
subsequent studies,165 or tendencies of the human psyche. The belief perseverance
paradigm, developed in psychology studies, demonstrates that people maintain
incorrect beliefs even after subsequently learning that their beliefs are based on
false information.166 Studies have not only shown that correcting widely held
misinformed beliefs result in little effect on peoples’ attitudes;167 they have shown
that a backfire effect can occur, as well. People can actually become more adamant
after receiving information that is contrary to their beliefs.168 Furthermore, if the
decision maker already holds ideological beliefs that reflect general biases against
women, minorities, and those of low socioeconomic status, he or she is more likely
to adhere to such misperceptions, rather than change his or her beliefs to attune to
correct information.169
Dr. Hallam Hurt, the lead investigator in the “A Thousand Babies” study,
agreed in an interview that previous media reports “created an aura of suspicion
around pregnant women of a certain background that was not deserved.”170 He
attributed this aura of suspicion to previous faulty beliefs of in utero cocaine
162. “Between 1985 and 2000, major U.S. newspapers featured 197 stories about pregnant
women and cocaine addiction . . . .” Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 390.
163. Emma Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood 157 (2011).
164. Paltrow, supra note 19, at 461−62.
165. Emma Cunliffe explains lack of awareness:
Court records and medical research are neither readily accessible to nor commonly accessed by the public. While judgments are now widely available
through free online services, it is relatively rare for a person to find and read
a judgment unless he or she has a personal or professional interest in the case.
Cunliffe, supra note 163, at 157.
166. Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Perseverance of Beliefs: Empirical and Normative
Considerations, in 4 Fallible Judgment in Behavioral Research: New Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science 17, 17−36 (Richard A. Shweder ed., 1980).
167. See, e.g., John Sides & Jack Citrin, How Large the Huddled Masses? The Causes and
Consequences of Public Misperceptions About Immigrant Populations (2007) (paper presented at 2007 annual meeting of Midwest Political Science Association), http://home.gwu.
edu/~jsides/huddled.pdf.
168. Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 Pol. Behav. 303, 323 (2010).
169. See id. at 323 (“[D]irect factual contradictions can actually strengthen ideologically
grounded factual beliefs . . . .”).
170. Decades Later, Drugs Didn’t Hold ‘Crack Babies’ Back, supra note 131.
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exposure, and to the discrepancies in testing of middle- and upper-middle-class
drug users.171 Furthermore, he stated that in retrospect, “[i]t was really, I think,
relatively easy to be more condemning regarding the moms who used drugs.”172
In the criminal justice context, a nationwide study endorses the theory
that judges often base sentences on perceptions of appropriate gender roles, and
whether the convicted crime supports or contradicts such roles.173 For instance,
women receive more lenient sentences than their male counterparts for many
crimes.174 However, when gender roles are violated—for instance, in convictions
for child abandonment—judges give women harsher sentences than their male
counterparts.175 It is logical to suspect that in the civil commitment context where
discretionary power is as great as—if not greater than—criminal sentencing,
judges are just as likely to base determinations of dangerousness on perceptions
of conformity to or violation of gender roles.
Use of emotionally charged language in statutes policing pregnant
women invokes gender roles and affects how a statute is interpreted during a
court proceeding.176 For instance, De Ville and Kopelman argue that the use of
statutory language such as “expectant mother” (rather than “pregnant woman”) in
describing a person to be reviewed for commitment “highlights their social role
and presumptive duties to their fetuses and society, that is, their status as expectant
mothers.”177 They argue that “such an approach might be expected to focus on
maternal duty and devalue individual rights.”178 As a result, when a court reviews
a pregnant woman’s case under a dangerousness standard, it inevitably focuses
on maternal duty, which can unnecessarily stigmatize a woman as threatening and
unmotherly, rather than simply in need of treatment.179
When legislatures elect to use terms such as “unborn child” rather than
“fetus,” the language shifts “the legal calculus from one that balances a woman’s
rights against state interests, to one that balances a woman’s rights against a

171. Id.
172. Id. (emphasis added); see also Brooks, supra note 49, at 44 (arguing that experts
might formulate medical opinions on perceived societal expectations).
173. Becker, supra note 19, at 238 (discussing Matthew Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Differential Sentencing of Women and Men in the U.S.A., 12 Int’l J. Soc. L. 401, 410 (1984)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 334 (“A statute’s language, the legislators’
choice of terms, can reflect the underlying ideology that inspired the law and have a practical
impact on how the policy is implemented.”).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Brooks, supra note 49, at 39.
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child’s rights.”180 This shift, in particular, removes pregnant persons from the
traditional civil commitment analysis, and increases the likelihood that biases outside
of traditional dangerousness analyses will improperly influence judges and jurors.181
Although the American Medical Association has found “that addiction is
not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower,”182 statutes that form the
basis for civil commitment with terminology such as “habitually lacks self-control”183
reinforce the notion that addiction is due to individual culpability. The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists—arguably in the best position to develop
prenatal care policy—recognizes that involuntary civil commitment approaches
“treat addiction as a moral failing.”184
Invoking one’s constitutional right to refuse medical treatment185 can lead to
involuntary commitment.186 Similarly, in the pregnancy context, Wisconsin’s child
welfare statute allows for commitment on the basis that an “adult expectant mother
is refusing or has refused to accept any alcohol or drug abuse services offered to her
or is not making or has not made a good faith effort to participate in any alcohol or
other drug abuse services offered to her.”187 These statutes, in effect, force pregnant
women to succumb to their physicians’ “personal values and preferences regarding
treatment.”188 For example, a pregnant woman like Alicia could fall under the statute
by refusing her physician’s “offer” for alcohol or drug abuse services, even when
such services are not medically necessary, but are insisted upon merely because she
had previously used drugs or alcohol. Additionally, an open definition of “good faith
effort” invites decision makers to rely upon their beliefs of what mothers generally
should be doing, rather than considering the individual woman’s attempts that would
be sufficient in her specific circumstances.
180. De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 334; see also Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women’s Liberty, 43 Hastings L.J. 569
(1992).
181. Current academic scholarship explores in-depth the attempts of fetal right supporters
to promote the legal myth that a mother and unborn child are separate legal persons. This becomes especially problematic in the civil commitment context where determinations of dangerousness can improperly include an unborn child in the equation. See, e.g., Cherry, supra
note 19, at 178−79; Lynn Paltrow, Punishment and Prejudice: Judging Drug Using Pregnant
Women, in Mother Troubles 73−78 (Julia Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999).
182. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Medical Association in Support of Neither Party
at 7, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936).
183. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2011).
184. ACOG No. 473, supra note 30, at 1.
185. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
186. Several statutes incorporate refusal of medical treatment as grounds for involuntary
commitment. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-104 (2014); Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §§ 572.003, 572.005 (West 2010). As applied in case law see, for example, Wessel v.
Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Ark. 1978), In re Melas, 371 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985); In re J.B., 705 P.2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1985).
187. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.347 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
188. Cherry, supra note 19, at 170.
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Furthermore, this approach ignores other factors aside from ongoing drug
use that may explain a failure to complete recommended treatment. Failure of
recommended services by itself, as stated in the Minnesota statute,189 does not
necessarily reflect dangerousness. Instead, failure of recommended treatment
could be due to a host of factors wholly unrelated to whether or not there is current
substance use or abuse. A pregnant woman could “fail” a recommended treatment
not for a positive drug test, but for missed sessions. The few available treatment
programs for pregnant women have been historically male-centered190 and unable
to provide services necessary for many women.191 The barriers that result from the
lack of childcare, accessibility to transportation, and affordable treatment options
rebut the notion that “failure” to receive recommended treatment is equivalent to
refusal of treatment because of ongoing use.192
Where state statutes afford or require a guardian ad litem to represent a
fetus,193 the physical presence of a legal representative for the fetus can lead to
greater weight allocated to fetal interests to the detriment of a woman’s rights.
In Wisconsin, the guardian ad litem is required to meet with the expectant
mother to “assess the appropriateness and safety of the environment of the . . .
unborn child.”194 Not only does such statutory language reduce a woman to an
“environment” for a fetus,195 but it also encourages the guardian ad litem to make
a determination based on his or her opinion of the woman rather than based on
medical evidence.
Decisions surrounding whether commitment criteria are met, hearing
dates, and the location of the assigned treatment center can also have special
implications for pregnant women. Since the dangerousness standard is arguably
satisfied on the basis of the possible future harm to the fetus, the commitment
process can be “intentionally prolonged so that her detention and release coincide
with the duration of her gestational period,” despite state laws setting time
limitations.196 This abuse of discretionary power ignores that the alleged threat
of danger may cease well before the woman’s due date. When the duration of
189. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.5561(2) (West 2009).
190. Linden, supra note 112, at 138.
191. Dailard & Nash, supra note 135, at 6.
192. ACOG No. 473, supra note 30.
193. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.213, .235 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
194. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.235(3)(b)(1) (West 2011).
195. Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493.
196. Garcia, supra note 25, at 178. This would not be the first time a judge inappropriately
based the length of detention on the length of the woman’s pregnancy, instead of factors traditionally considered. Id. at 198 (describing a D.C. Superior Court case where a judge disregarded applicable guidelines in order to sentence a pregnant drug user with jail time in efforts
to protect the fetus); Cherry, supra note 19, at 147−48 (citing Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Cleary,
754 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 2001) (conditioning length of sentencing term to prevent a woman
from accessing an abortion)).
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involuntary civil commitment is based solely on a woman’s gestational period, it
violates U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence: commitment must end once the danger
ceases to exist.197
Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court firmly stated, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, that
“[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation
of a person’s physical liberty.”198 Yet, in the context of civil commitment, women
with alleged substance use are often committed due to intolerance and animosity,
rather than demonstrated dangerousness shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Alicia’s case demonstrates these inherent problems and the substantial loss
of liberty that can result from the multiplication effect of biases concerning pregnant
women. First, one can argue that the physical appearance of Alicia shackled in the
courtroom, with only her fetus receiving counsel, encourages the decision maker
to interpret Wisconsin’s emotionally charged statutory language to render Alicia
“an environment” for the fetus, rather than a person with constitutional rights.199
Furthermore, a dangerousness determination based solely on the refusal of medical
treatment ignores research that shows cost as the leading reason people (including
Alicia) forgo mental health treatment.200 As seen in Alicia’s case, when dangerousness
remains undefined and medical testimony is not required,201 unsubstantiated beliefs
can result in a finding of dangerousness absent any expert testimony traditionally
relied upon in civil commitment settings. A determination based solely on a
medical professional’s referral, as in Alicia’s case, can be unreliable; some medical
professionals rationalize exaggerating “dangerousness” if they firmly believe that
an individual is too “sick” to know that he or she needs treatment.202
In effect, involuntary civil commitment of pregnant women suspected
of substance use is both under- and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive in that
it targets women who are vulnerable to biases—women of racial minorities and
low socioeconomic status—and ignores other populations of women who may use
substances during pregnancy. It is over-inclusive in that it results in a deprivation of
liberty for women who do not satisfy the traditional dangerousness requirement, as
197. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[E]ven if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer
existed.”).
198. Id. at 575.
199. See Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493.
200. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Reasons for Not Receiving Treatment Among Adults with Serious Mental Illness
(2003), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k3/MHnoTX/MHnoTX.pdf.
201. De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 337.
202. Brooks, supra note 49, at 44.
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in Alicia’s case. Instead of finding clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness
to self or others, civil commitment decisions continue to depend upon whether the
pregnant woman supports or violates gender norms and whether she falls into a
racial and socioeconomic category that supports the decision maker’s preconceived
beliefs.203 As written, statutes policing pregnant women by forcible civil commitment
cannot be applied in a manner that would avoid the problems arising from sanism,
sexism, racism, and socioeconomic biases.

203. “The legislation may allow decision-makers to base their judgments of ‘substantial’
and ‘risk,’ not on the complicated and sometimes unequivocal medical and science evidence
regarding maternal substance abuse, but rather on their view of what constitutes appropriate
behavior for an ‘expectant mother.’” De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 337.
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